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GlossaryAu10; 12
dt0010 Amygdala It is responsible for processing of emotion (e.g.,
fear, disgust, happiness).
dt0015 Association areas These are regions of the neocortex
beyond the primary sensory processing cortex and cortical
areas processing information before the primary motor
cortex. Unimodal association areas surround primary
sensory and primary motor areas, and multimodal
association areas lie beyond these, that is, in between
unimodal sensorimotor association areas.
dt0020 Cingulate cortex It lies immediately superior to the corpus
callosum, which is the white matter axonal fiber bundle that
connects the cerebral hemispheres. Cingulate cortex is
included in the limbic system implicated in emotion and
motivation and continues posteriorly as the
parahippocampal gyrus in the temporal lobe, which
provides input to the hippocampus, consistent with a role in
episodic memory.
dt0025 Frontal lobe It extends from the anterior-most part of the
brain to the central sulcus where the primary motor cortex
ends. The frontal lobe contains motor areas and lateral and
medial prefrontal regions and anterior cingulated regions
implicated in cognitive control, working memory, and
selective attention.
dt0030 Linguistic This refers to perceptual cues (i.e., words) and
actions involved in natural language, including semantics,
grammar, and phonetics.
dt0035 Mental state This is a state of brain activity related to an
introspective mental state, that is, a state accompanied by a
subjective quality of conscious experience (or qualia, e.g.,
feeling a headache, taste of food, your experience of the
colors in a rainbow). Mirror neuron circuits, in which
neurons involved in manipulating objects are also involved
in perceiving another animate agent prefer that action, may
underlie social simulations for embodied cognition.
dt0040Occipital lobe It is the most posterior part of the neocortex.
It includes the primary visual area (V1) in striate cortex and
extrastriate visual cortex that lies anterior to V1, as well as
association areas that are object-sensitive, responding more
strongly to intact images of objects than scrambled versions
with no coherent object structure. This lobe is
retinotopically organized such that adjacent neurons
respond to different but nonoverlapping parts of the visual
field. Extrastriate visual areas contribute to semantic
memory based on an embodied cognition account.
dt0045Parietal lobe This lies in the dorsal posterior part of the
cerebral cortex. It includes the angular gyrus region in the
lateral inferior part (Brodmann’s area [BA] 39; areas PGa and
PGp) and the supramarginal gyrus (BA 40) that have been
implicated in semantic processing in response to written and
spoken words. This angular gyrus region extends posteriorly
into the anterior occipital lobe.
dt0050Temporal lobe It is a ventrally located region of the
neocortex that includes association areas for visual
processing, primary and association areas for auditory
processing, and multimodal association areas. The anterior
temporal lobe has been proposed to be an amodal hub for
semantic memory. The medial temporal lobe includes the
hippocampus and the surrounding cortex of the
parahippocampal region, which is composed of perirhinal
cortex, parahippocampal gyrus, and entorhinal cortex, and
may also represent semantic memory.
s0010 Semantic Memory is One Type of Memory
p0010 Semantic memory is conscious long-term memory for mean-
ing, understanding, and conceptual facts about the world.
Semantic memory is one of the two main varieties of explicit,
conscious, long-term memory, which is memory that can be
retrieved into conscious awareness after a long delay (from
several seconds to years). Endel Tulving in 1972 (building
upon a distinction between two primary forms of memory by
Reiff and Scheers in 1959) distinguished between semantic and
episodic memory. Episodic memory refers to stored represen-
tations for personally experienced episodes from one’s life
within a particular spatiotemporal context (e.g., dinner in
Berkeley in January this year). Semantic memory refers to
stored representations for meaningful facts or world knowl-
edge, regardless of the spatiotemporal context in which the
information was acquired and without information about per-
sonal experiences surrounding learning the information (e.g.,
the concept ‘dinner’), and is necessary for language. Crucially,
while episodic memory involves awareness of a feeling of
having personally experienced an event or item, regardless
of meaning (i.e., an item could be a nonsensical figure like
abstract art and so has no meaning but has been experienced
before as on multiple museum visits), semantic memory
involves awareness of meaning unaccompanied by a feeling
of familiarity of having previously experienced the event or
item or remembering the place and time of the personal
learning experience(s). For example, using semantic memory,
you know what a dog is and can read the word ‘dog’ and be
aware of the meaning of this concept, but you do not remem-
ber where and when you first learned about a dog or even
necessarily subsequent personal experiences with dogs that
went into building your concept of what a dog is. Even without
a feeling of personal experience, you know what a dog is when
you see, hear, or read about a dog. Thus, you have semantic
memory for meaning, regardless of a feeling of familiarity or
recollection of personal experiences with the origins of the
concept.
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s0015 Language, Concepts, Categories, and Semantic
Networks
s0020 Hierarchical Model
p0015 Ideas about semantic memory developed from attempts to
explain how human language communicates concepts. While
computer scientists proposed semantic nets for translating natu-
ral language as early as 1956, the term ‘semantic memory’
emerged in psychology in early models of human knowledge
about word concepts circa 1969. Collins and Quillian viewed
semantic memory as a hierarchical network of relations among
concepts. A concept refers tomeaning, which is stored in seman-
tic memory. Language enables an arbitrary symbol, such as a
streamof sounds comprising aword (e.g., ‘dog’), to be associated
with the memory representation of the meaning of the symbol
(i.e., the semantic memory of dogs). As described in concept
learning research, a concept is a mental representation that
places anobject, event, or idea into a category. Semanticmemory
can thus be said to be the store of mental representations of
categories. In their original formulation of the organization
of semantic memory, Collins and Quillian in 1969 assumed
that categories are organizedhierarchically, anddefining features
compose each category. For example, an animal has skin,moves,
eats, and breathes. In 1976, Eleanor Rosch proposed different
levels of categories. For example, song and field sparrows are
subordinate categories of the more general category of sparrow,
which is a basic-level category, along with eagle and cardinal of
the superordinate-level category of birds, and, at a still more
general, superordinate level, birds and fish are animals. Collins
and Quillian’s theory predicts that the response time to classify
whether a feature belongs to a category depends uponhowmany
nodes or levels of the hierarchy must be traversed to do the task,
which was experimentally confirmed.
s0025 Feature Overlap
p0020 Smith and colleagues modified this basic framework to suggest
that the meaning of a concept is a set of features, as opposed to
a single node. Further, characteristic features are merely typical
of a concept (e.g., robins are bipedal, have wings, perch in
trees, and are wild), whereas defining features are more essen-
tial (e.g., robins have red breasts). Consistent with this feature
overlap model, people rate robins and sparrows as more typi-
cal birds than ducks and geese, and robins and sparrow are
rated as more similar to each other than the other birds.
However, there may be no defining features; as noted by the
philosopher Wittgenstein in 1953, there is no feature that all
games share. Also, feature overlap models compare features to
decide the concept, but evidence indicates that other kinds of
knowledge are relevant. For example, while a butterfly is read-
ily categorized as an insect, subjects instructed to generate
members of the insect category infrequently mention a butter-
fly. Such problemsmotivated alternative theories that continue
to be debated and tested. The main competing theories can be
grouped into those that propose that categories depend upon a
prototype representation, which is an average of all examples,
or multiple representations composed of each of the exemplars
(or instances) of the category (e.g., each example of a dog
experienced), referred to as prototype versus exemplar theories,
respectively.
s0030Spreading Activation
p0025Most current theories organize concepts and categories as
nodes in a network in which nodes can connect to one another
via a semantic link, thereby associating together related con-
cepts or categories. The length of the link in a semantic network
model varies with the relatedness and associations between
concepts. For example, car, truck, and bus may be connected
directly via short links, and each of these to fire engine via a
longer link. Nodes can be connected directly or indirectly via
links to other nodes. For example, apple may connect directly
to red and connect indirectly to fire engine through the red
node. As in the earlier Collins and Quilian model, the proper-
ties of a concept/category can be connected to its node. Seman-
tic network theories propose that activation spreads from
one node to another along the links between them, allowing
for even indirectly linked concepts to activate one another.
Semantic networks can easily explain retrieval of meaning.
For example, when thinking about apples, one might activate
the concept of red, which might trigger one to think about
fire engines, stoplights, or bricks.
p0030The semantic network approach has the advantages over
other theories of predictive power (perhaps too much so that it
becomes unfalsifiable, according to some critics) and being
readily modeled using neurocomputational methods (i.e., con-
nectionist or parallel distributed processingmodels, as described
byRumelhart andMcClelland, 1986). A node can bemodeled as
a neuronal cell, and the dendrites (input) and axons (output)
that interconnect neurons to each other are modeled as links
between nodes. Neural network models incorporate recurrent
and feedback connections that are well-known principles of
neocortical organization. A node in a semantic network has a
level of activation representing the probability that the neuron
will fire, thereby potentially activating a connected neuron suffi-
ciently that it also fires. Activation in one node could thereby
spread to other nodes connected to it directly or eventually
indirectly. Semantic memory is acquired using learning rules
(e.g., hebbian plasticity) that determine network connectivity
by modifying the weights among connections based on ex-
perience. Contemporary neural network models have more
biological realism.
s0035Compound Cue
p0035Despite these advantages of the spreading activation account,
compound cue models propose that semantic memory oper-
ates like other types of memory. For example, in the case of
episodic recognition, memory is an interconnected feature set
representing the item (i.e., its meaning), its learning context,
and its relation with other such feature sets. Recognition cues
are held in mind briefly to probe the feature sets, producing a
familiarity signal send to a decision process, enabling a deci-
sion that the stimulus is old or new. Likewise, in the types of
implicit memory tasks used to assess semantic memory, addi-
tional cues are relevant beyond those used for recognition. For
example, in the lexical decision task often used in semantic
memory studies, people decide faster whether a letter string is a
real word when the target word (e.g., doctor) is preceded by
a word that is related (e.g., nurse) than unrelated (e.g., butter).
Prime and target are both cues that together constitute a third
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type of association besides the associations between target and
context plus target and other feature sets, which are available
for recognition. Compound cue theory attributes semantic
priming for related primes and target pairs to the greater num-
ber of shared associates between them than for unrelated pairs.
s0040 Knowledge and Generic Memory Encompass
Semantic and Nonsemantic Memory
p0040 The common label, semantic memory, may not be the most
appropriate but rather the term generic memory (suggested by
D. L. Hintzman) or knowledge (suggested here) can include
nonsemantic information. Consider that, in general, knowl-
edge is what you know (e.g., that dogs bark, your house num-
ber, the capital of France, the color of spinach, the shape of a
cat, as well as their meanings). Although linguistic stimuli (i.e.,
words) activate meaning, objects, scenes, and people are also
meaningful. To activate meaning, the perceptual features of the
stimulus must be matched to stored memory of these sensory-
based features. For example, to categorize a dog, its perceived
shape or other identifying perceptual attribute(s) (e.g., a bark)
must match successfully to memory for the perceptual form
associated with the dog category. Likewise, to activate the
meaning of a word, the word form being currently perceived
must match memory for the perceptual form of that word.
Thus, semantic memory depends upon non-semantic memoryAu5
to mediate between the perceived cue and its meaning. In
addition, activation of nonsemantic memory can also activate
associated nonsemantic information about the stimulus, as
when observing a dog and becoming aware of its meaning
and associated perceptual (e.g., its color, sound, smell),
motor (e.g., its movements), emotional (e.g., fear), or mental
state information.
p0045 Like semantic memory, nonsemantic knowledge is distinct
from episodic memory. For example, patients with visual
object agnosia are slow and make errors categorizing common
objects when visually presented (e.g., seeing a dog but being
unable to name or describe it meaningfully as a dog) but can
tell that they saw the object before, demonstrating episodic
memory. Moreover, all forms of visual object agnosia involve
some impaired perceptual processing, even associative (i.e.,
semantic) subtypes; a knowledge system for the perceptual
form of an object is necessary to know its meaning. In most
theories, this perceptual matching stage must, to some extent,
succeed before semantic memory can become active. Nonethe-
less, substantial parallel and interactive processing between
perceptual form and meaning can occur. Thus, activating
meaning always requires matching memory to the perceptual
form of the referent, be it a word, object, face, or place.
s0045 Knowledge, Priming, and Awareness
p0050 Semantic memory and nonsemantic knowledge are nonepiso-
dic, and aspects of these memories may be conscious, while
others lie outside of awareness. Conscious semantic memory
is primarily the variety of explicit memory that has been dis-
tinguished from episodic memory. After all, clearly, one can
become aware of a concept in a semantic network, as when you
are aware that you know what a word means. However, one is
not necessarily conscious of activating the nodes or links in the
network itself that lead to awareness of meaning or aware of
the processes that match a perceptual form to its nonsemantic
memory. Nonetheless, these nonconscious processes can lead
ultimately to awareness of the shape, color, category, and
meaning of the object.
p0055By contrast, nonconscious implicit memory is thought to
include nonsemantic memory as well as situations in which
semantic memory is activated nonconsciously. Implicit mem-
ory is typically probed by repeating information. In such
priming paradigms, the item (doctor) or a version of it
(a picture of a doctor) or a related item (nurse) is presented,
and then, following a delay, the item (e.g., doctor) is presented
again. Relative to unrepeated (i.e., new) items, repeated items
exhibit faster and more accurate performance, as well as differ-
ent brain response characteristics. Repetition priming (i.e.,
doctor–doctor), conceptual priming (i.e., a picture of and the
word for doctor), and semantic priming (i.e., nurse–doctor)
are varieties of implicit (nonconscious) memory. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that evidence is accumulating that con-
sciousness is not the critical factor distinguishing varieties of
learning and memory but rather the computational and deci-
sion demands of the task, and how these recruit different brain
structures, are primary.
s0050Standard Theory of the Semantic Memory System
p0060Research on knowledge has focused on how meaningful
(semantic) representations are organized, leaving nonsemantic
knowledge organization relatively less understood. Multiple
memory systems theory distinguishes between a semantic
memory system and a nonsemantic perceptual representation
system that can be matched to a currently perceived stimulus,
for example, to determine what an object is, such as a dog,
based on its perceived shape. This distinction of memory sys-
tems theory essentially reflects its adoption of the standard
theory of meaning that proposes that conceptual knowledge
resides in a single amodal system with a uniform architecture
and exists separate from modal sensorimotor systems.
s0055Anterior Temporal Lobe Stores Amodal Meaning
p0065Multiple memory systems theory (originating with Elizabeth
Warrington in 1979) adopted the distinction between seman-
tic and episodic memory and added the proposal that different
brain systems support each type. In particular, while episodic
memory depends upon the medial temporal lobe (MTL),
semantic memory depends upon association areas of neocor-
tex that lie outside primary sensorimotor areas and outside the
MTL. Studies of patients with semantic memory problems
indicate that an amodal system may reside in the anterior
temporal lobe (ATL). The ATL is considered to be the best
candidate for an amodal hub for meaning based on convergent
evidence from patients with semantic memory problems and
its anatomical connectivity. The ATL lies next to limbic system
structures, including the amygdala and the orbitofrontal cor-
tex, which has been implicated in emotion, reward, and moti-
vation processing, thereby enabling associations among these
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abilities and sensorimotor and linguistic aspects of concepts.
Further, the ATL lies next to the anterior MTL system for epi-
sodic memory, which is thought to contribute to learning
conceptual knowledge gradually over multiple experiences, as
when many personal experiences with a variety of dogs gradu-
ally result in a concept of the dog category. Hub theories,
however, do not equate amodal with cross-modal (i.e., picture
and word modalities), emphasizing that a cross-modal (or
multimodal) region that integrates information from multiple
sensory and/or motor regions may not perform the true amo-
dal function required of a semantic hub. For example, the
angular gyrus performs multimodal sensory integration but
may not function as a semantic system for linguistic purposes.
p0070 However, it is unclear what exactly is the difference between
amodal and cross-modal/multimodal, and this distinction will
be critical for determining the anatomical locus of an amodal
hub for meaning that abstracts across stimulus form. Consider
that any region that integrates information, (a) across sensory
modalities, (b) multiple sensory plus motor or linguistic in-
formation, or (c) any of these plus emotion or mental state
information, would meet the definitions of multimodal, cross-
modal, and amodal (i.e., a similar pattern of neural activity is
activated by more than one type of physical stimulus or type of
response in the case of motor output). Moreover, alternative
views about the organization of semantic memory, including
those that posit no amodal hub, can accommodate the anato-
mical definition offered for the amodal semantic hub (i.e.,
integrates sensorimotor and emotion/reward information).
p0075 Further, anatomical evidence suggests that the ATL may not
be amodal (or fully multimodal). Some evidence suggests that,
rather than being a domain-general semantic hub, the ATL
stores knowledge about a unique item (e.g., an individual
person, a famous landmark), which may be particularly neces-
sary for socially relevant knowledge, as social information
necessarily involves two or more unique people. Consider
also that nonspatial (or object) processing inputs connect to
the hippocampus via the perirhinal cortex in the MTL and the
adjacent associative cortex, as well as the ventral visual path-
way in the occipitotemporal cortex, in the ATL, whereas spatial
processing inputs connect to the MTL via the parahippocampal
gyrus and the adjacent associative cortex, as well as the dorsal
visual pathway in the occipitoparietal cortex, in the posterior
temporal lobe. In short, the ATL provides input to the peri-
rhinal (nonspatial) and parahippocampal (spatial), which pro-
vide inputs to the hippocampus in the MTL. If the ATL is
amodal, then how can it send segregated, modal nonspatial,
and spatial inputs to the MTL? Modal segregation is difficult to
reconcile with a definition of semantic memory organization
that requires an amodal semantic hub where both nonspatial
(object) and spatial information must be combined. Other
types of sensorimotor, emotion, and reward inputs also send
segregated inputs into the MTL via the ATL.
s0060 Medial Temporal Lobe, Episodic Memory, and Meaning
p0080 Indeed, perhaps the brain structure that shows the most amo-
dal (or multimodal) properties is the MTL. The MTL shows
highly sensory-invariant response properties. For example,
MTL neurons respond to single individuals (e.g., Jennifer
Aniston), regardless of the form of the stimulus (i.e., varieties
of pictures, names), showing seemingly complete invariance,
and have been suggested to represent meaning in long-term
semantic memory. Further, MTL structures have been proposed
to construct representations of integrated multimodal percepts
that are sensitive to semantic variables.
p0085Spared new learning of knowledge in amnesia suggests that
the MTL is necessary not only for episodic memory but also for
semantic memory. However, this idea is hard to reconcile with
the substantial evidence dissociating episodic and semantic
memory. For example, patients with developmental amnesia in
which the MTL is dysfunctional from childhood have impaired
episodic memory but remarkably spared semantic memory.
Some evidence suggests that MTL amnesics can acquire some
new explicit knowledge, but this is limited in amount and gen-
eralization and attributable to the remaining spared MTL struc-
tures, clearly so in some cases and possibly in others. Whether
new explicit knowledge learning is spared in amnesia remains
controversial in part due to the inherent difficulties of the lesion
approach involving human patients; controlled, targeted lesions
cannot be done in humans and so residual sparing of critical
structures is hard to rule out. Overall, the evidence suggests that
knowledge can be acquired using primarily cortical mechanisms
but only through substantial repeated exposure, and episodic
encoding processes of theMTL accelerate knowledge learning by
integrating across multiple episodes in a way that also facilitates
generalization and abstraction of knowledge, consistent with
evidence that episodic and semantic memory are interlinked.
Episodic and semanticmemory systems have substantial mutual
interdependence during encoding and retrieval.
s0065Semantic Memory Includes Embodied
(Grounded) Knowledge
p0090Neuroscience largely invalidates the strong form of the stan-
dard theory. All current views about the organization of knowl-
edge incorporate an embodied (or grounded) cognition that
says that knowledge depends upon multiple modality-specific
systems, including those for sensorimotor properties in percep-
tual systems based on the senses (e.g., vision) and action
systems for motor planning as well as emotion and mental
states. For example, different modal knowledge systems in the
extrastriate occipitotemporal cortex support face, word, and
object knowledge. Within each system, modal knowledge var-
ies in how specifically physical properties are represented.
Some knowledge is more specific for a shape, spatial configu-
ration, or other physical property (e.g., visually specific object
knowledge) and others less so (i.e., being more abstract)
showing, for example, more invariance across changes in phys-
ical properties between experiences (e.g., an object from differ-
ent viewpoints) or cross-/multimodal activation patterns as
when stimuli with the same associated meaning (i.e., a picture,
sound, and word for dog) produce similar patterns of perfor-
mance or brain activity. By an embodied account, a brain area
can be both nonsemantic (e.g., sensorimotor), supporting, for
example, both perceptual processing and perceptual memory,
and semantic, supporting human symbolic abilities. Hybrid
theories suggest that one or more separate amodal system(s)
act as hub[s] or convergence zone[s] that interact reciprocally
with embodied knowledge systems.
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p0095 A key argument against embodied cognition is that so-
called abstract words, such as abstractAu6 and freedom, are unre-
lated to sensorimotor processes. The main counterargument
is that internal states, such as metacognition and emotion, are
also stored as knowledge, and introspective states provide
information that is central to representing abstract concepts.
Unfortunately, relatively little is known about abstract con-
cepts even though they play central roles in human cognition,
as most research has focused on concrete concepts.
s0070 Brain Basis of Knowledge
s0075 Word Meaning
s0080 Mental lexicon
p0100 How words activate meaning has been a central question in
language and semantic memory studies. The mental lexicon
stores word information, including meanings (i.e., semantic
memory for words), syntax, and perceptual word forms. Most
studies focused on speech comprehension, with early accounts
(e.g., Levelt) positing a processing sequence from word sounds
to syntax and finally to concepts in semantic memory. The
importance of sequential processing for language theory and
the fact that language comprehension is rapid, with all word
identification achieved even before sentences end, the timing
of semantic activation by words has been of greater interest
than anatomy. Consequently, most neuroscience studies of
semantics from words have used electromagnetic potentials
that have high temporal resolution lacking in anatomical
methods like functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
that instead has been used to determine the brain regions.
s0085 Linguistic N400
p0105 Most studies of language and semantic memory focus on the
linguistic N400, which is a scalp-recorded, negative electrical
potential peaking around 400ms that varies with semantic
processing between 300 and 500ms in response to written
words and spoken words for which the onset is slightly earlier.
The N400 indexes a multimodal, abstract knowledge system
for wordmeaning that is sensitive to ongoing context, construc-
tive, and processes semantic information over an extended time
period and across multiple brain regions. Thus, the meaning of
a word is extracted within about 300ms of processing. How-
ever, some lexical processing, including semantics, has been
argued recently to occur before the N400 since ERPs to words
between 200 and 300ms seem sensitive to lexical processes.
s0090 Anatomy of word concepts
p0110 The N400 in response to words indexes activity in the ATL and
the superior temporal gyrus, which are considered storage sites,
and the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), which sup-
ports efficient retrieval and encoding of this semantic knowl-
edge. While electromagnetic potential and fMRI findings were
combined to infer these neural generators, fMRI findings alone
suggest that a more extensive, left-lateralized (i.e., more activity
in the left cerebral hemisphere) network activates semantic
memory in response to written and spoken words. The tempo-
ral lobe regions recruited extend (a) posteriorly into the modal
visual association cortex implicated in category-specific se-
mantic deficits and semantic dementia and may store object
knowledge specifying perceptual and conceptual attributes and
support multimodal integration, and (b) medially into the
parahippocampal region of the MTL, implicating it as an inter-
facing region between the more lateral temporal cortex and the
episodic memory system in the hippocampus of the MTL.
Notably, the left superior temporal gyrus region implicated in
language comprehension problems of Wernicke’s aphasia is
mainly the modal auditory cortex for speech perception and
has not been implicated in word meaning, though the most
ventral part may contribute to processing abstract concepts.
Nearby, in the lateral inferior parietal lobe, an angular gyrus
region is greatly expanded in humans, receives multimodal
inputs, and may support the conceptual retrieval, integration,
and fluent combination processes critical for understanding
discourse. While these regions are on the lateral surface, the
rest of the regions are medial. Specifically, the posterior cingu-
late region includes the retrosplenial cortex, which connects
directly and bidirectionally with the MTL system for episodic
memory and may promote episodic and semantic memory
interactions. This cingulate region has been implicated in
visuospatial, mental imagery, and simulation functions of
both memory systems. In the frontal lobe, dorsomedial parts
(BA 8) may support internally guiding semantic memory
retrieval, while ventromedial parts support the emotional sig-
nificance of concepts.
s0095Semantic (default) network for words
p0115Intriguingly, the lateral temporal lobe regions, the angular gyrus,
posterior cingulate, and medial prefrontal regions of this pro-
posed semanticmemory network for words (i.e., all wordmean-
ing regions except VLPFC) are all key components of the default
network. The default network activates in an anticorrelated
manner with an active task network, which essentially includes
the rest of the neocortex, including VLFPC. The active task
network activates more than the default network during tasks
demanding greater selective attention, working memory, and
executive functions. By contrast, the default network activates
more than the active task network in many language studies,
episodic memory tasks (for which the MTL also activates), and
rest (i.e., when minimally engaged with a task). The default
network is affected earlier and more than other brain systems
in Alzheimer’s disease patients who develop progressively severe
problems encoding new long-term episodic memory and
retrieving knowledge. The default network may thus have a
greater role in semantic memory, consistent with proposals
that this network supports mental imagery or simulation pro-
cesses that creatively synthesize, integrate, and associate multi-
modal information, especially episodic memory from the MTL,
across past experiences. These functions would be crucial for
constructing sequential, higher-order concepts from multiple
life episodes, such as generalizing across numerous restaurant
visits to construct a framework to comprehend the next such
visit, a knowledge representation known as a schema, and to
predict and anticipate how the next such visit will unfold over
time, a sequential knowledge representation known as a script.
However, it is unclear whether these regions are sufficient to
support all aspects of meaning, as these studies focused on
words. After all, other regions in the active task network, includ-
ing the VLFPC, are implicated in semantic memory and contrib-
ute important processes to knowledge encoding and retrieval
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and to mental imagery. For example, script knowledge evoked
by linguistic and nonlinguistic (e.g., picture) sequences involves
active task network regions that interact with basal ganglia
structures implicated in sequential processing and implicit
learning more than the default network (Figure 1).
s0100 Brain Basis of Multiple Knowledge Systems
s0105 Nonlinguistic Stimuli
p0120 The focus on semantic memory to words has left meaning in
response to nonlinguistic stimuli relatively less well under-
stood. Most work with nonlinguistic stimuli used pictures,
revealing visual object knowledge. This topic is important
because such research enables direct links between human
and nonhuman animals not afforded by word studies since
nonhuman animals have at best only very limited linguistic
capacity, and most neuroscience questions can be addressed
only in nonhuman animals for ethical reasons. Such links are
necessary to understand the neural underpinnings of semantic
memory from neural circuits to systems becauseAu7 . Moreover,
visual object knowledge is most important for human cogni-
tion, as vision is the dominant sensory modality, the best
characterized sensory system, and objects are the focus of
visual processing and attention.
s0110Early N3 Complex to Objects
p0125In response to a visually presented object, an N400-like scalp
electrical potential, the N3 complex (aka N300, N350, N390),
indexes neurophysiological processes between 200 and 500ms
involved in acquiring categorical knowledge, retrieving knowl-
edge and implicit memory about objects, andmaking cognitive
decisions based on object knowledge. The N3 complex peaks
around 350ms, differs in scalp distribution from the N400
(i.e., the N3 has a frontal maximum and can become positive
over occipitotemporal locations, whereas the N400 is centro-
parietal), and cognitive manipulations affect it earlier, around
200ms, than the N400. The earlier time course of the N3
relative to the N400 suggests that the arbitrary relationship
between a word and its meaning takes longer to activate than
the (nonarbitrary) association between a perceived object and
its meaning for which the shape and other physical properties
are part of its meaning. The N3 complex indexes a modal
knowledge system frommore visually specific to more abstract
or invariant representations stored in extrastriate occipital and
ventral temporal cortex. Crucial evidence that the processes
underlying the N3 complex are part of a semantic memory
system is that the N3 complex is sensitive to similar contextual,
memory, and conceptual manipulations as the linguistic
N400. For example, semantic priming, that is, preceding an
item by a semantically related item (e.g., doctor preceded by
nurse), reduces both brain potentials and response time. The
different scalp distributions of the N3 and N400 indicate mul-
tiple, modality-specific knowledge systems. This is due to
recruitment of the occipitotemporal cortex involved in stor-
ing object knowledge versus anterior and superior temporal
regions involved in storing word knowledge. The VLPFC has a
general role in semantic memory, however, controlling both
posterior cortical processes for object and word knowledge to
accomplish task-relevant goals and for decision-making (e.g.,
categorization). Notably, faces also evoke a functionally simi-
lar frontal N400-like potential. In sum, functionally similar but
somewhat anatomically distinct, semantic memory systems
support knowledge about words, faces, and other objects.
s0115Cortical Object Knowledge
p0130Multiple knowledge systems are consistent with the functionally
localized, hierarchical organization of the neocortex. From pos-
terior to anterior areas along the ventral stream, stimulus selec-
tivity becomes increasingly complex from more elementary,
local features and greater visual-specificity to higher-order global
shapes and combinations of features and increasing visual object
constancy (i.e., similar responses despite changes in orientation,
size, or other visual properties). Human occipitotemporal cortex
is necessary for normal behavior on wide-ranging object cogni-
tion tasks. Patients with occipitotemporal damage have visual
object agnosia: impaired perceiving, categorizing, and recogniz-
ing of visual objects with the pattern of deficits varying with
the locus of damage. Occipitotemporal areas are retinotopic
(a)
(b)
−1 µV 
N3
complex
200 ms
(c)
(d)
Figure 1f0010 Brain systems for knowledge. (a) Rendering of the left lateral
neocortex (Montreal Neurological Institute individual canonical brain,
SPM99) showing the lateral inferior posterior parietal regions, including
the angular gyrus, and superior temporal gyrus parts of the default state
network implicated in semantic memory for words. (b) Sagittal slice
through the medial cortex showing the medial cortical areas that form
most of the default state network implicated in semantic memory for
words. (c) Rendering as in a, except showing the right lateral neocortex
and parts of the active task network implicated in knowledge about
visually presented objects during a categorization task. (d) The negative
event-related potential called the N3 complex in response to visually
presented known objects (from an experiment like that in c). Note, a and
c were computed based on data from an experiment described in
Schendan and Stern (2008) Cerebral Cortex 18(7): 1695–1711; results in
a are from the contrast of old> new objects from different atypical views
(uncorrected p< 0.001) on an episodic recognition task; results in c are
from the contrast of unusual > canonical views of known visual objects
(e.g., dog) on a categorization task (uncorrected p< 0.05). Results in b
were computed from the contrast of control > mental rotation
(uncorrected p< 0.05) based on data from Schendan and Stern (2007)
Neuroimage 35(3): 1264–1277Au1 . Results in d are based on an ERP version
of that used for fMRI in c; the N3 is more negative for atypical than
canonical views of known visual objects for which knowledge is more
challenging to activate.
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(i.e., adjacent neurons respond to different but nonoverlapping
parts of the visual field) and object-sensitive (i.e., responding
more strongly to intact images of objects than scrambled
versions with no coherent object structure). However, recent
evidence suggests that object-sensitivity, object perception, and
invariant object knowledge continue into the MTL, including
the hippocampus. Extended object processing and memory
from the occipital into the MTL accords with embodied cogni-
tion but not the standard theory of an amodal system.
s0120 Domains of Knowledge
p0135 Multiple knowledge systems are consistent with embodied cog-
nition but also an alternative, though not incompatible idea that
it is object domain that primarily constrains conceptual knowl-
edge organization.Distributed domain-specific theories propose
that evolutionary history affects development, which thereby
determines object domain. Convergent findings suggest that
the domains are living animate (e.g., mammals), living inani-
mate (e.g., trees), conspecifics (e.g., humans), and tools. For
example, an individual brain-damaged patient can display
category-specific semantic problems with multimodal input,
implicating abstract representations of conceptual knowledge.
Both picture-naming and verbal questions about objects can be
impaired for living animate objects (e.g., animals) but spared for
nonanimals. Even so, the patients can also have problems with
nonsemantic, visual structural processing and knowledge. These
and other findings motivated other multiple semantic system
accounts to distinguish instead between nonliving things, ani-
mals, and fruits/vegetables, proposing that visual motion and
functional information are more important for knowing about
nonliving things and other kinds of sensory information are
more important for knowing about living things of which
fruits/vegetables depend more on color and taste information
(than animals do). Notably, a domain account need not imply
that semantic memory is modular but rather current ideas
emphasize that domain-specific neural networks are distributed
across multiple cortical regions. Each domain of knowledge can
be further subdivided according to the sensorimotor, affect, and
mental state processes posited in embodied cognition theories,
enabling a rapprochement between accounts. A central idea in
hybrid accounts is that sensory processing within a specific
domain (e.g., how a conspecific human looks based on visual
processing) will be connected (e.g., via links in the semantic
network) to other processes (e.g., how a conspecific human
also sounds, emotes, or acts based on motor processing). Over-
all, findings converge on the idea that knowledge is organized
across multiple cortical systems, contrary to the standard theory
of meaning incorporated in multiple memory systems theory,
but debates continue over the organizational principles govern-
ing the divisions (embodiment, domains, sensory-functional).
s0125 Frontal Lobe Controls Knowledge Encoding
and Retrieval
s0130 Controlled Knowledge Retrieval and Decisions in
Prefrontal Cortex (PFC)
p0140 The VLPFC controls knowledge encoding of mappings
between knowledge stored in posterior areas and decision
processes in frontal areas and subsequent retrieval. The human
lateral PFC is organized functionally along a gradient from
abstract decision and action planning processes in more rostral
parts (e.g., VLPFC) to increasingly more concrete response-
related processes in more caudal parts (e.g., premotor cortex
[PM]). This system maintains patterns of activity for multiple
types of information (e.g., linguistic, visuospatial, object, rules)
in functionally distinct neural populations, each of which influ-
ences (controls) other areas to accomplish a mental or overt
action. For example, to decide the category of a visual object,
dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC) and PM accumulate and compare
visual evidence obtained from the occipitotemporal cortex to
compute a decision according to a rule that determines the
choice, which involves more rostral frontopolar (BA 10) areas.
In the parietal lobe, the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) also accumu-
lates evidence, consistent with its strong bidirectional connec-
tions with some decision-making regions. The VLPFC has an
important role in disambiguating knowledge, as when multiple
interpretations of the input result from initial processing (e.g.,
ambiguous figures, impoverished percepts, multiple alternative
meanings or knowledge types are competing), and it interacts
reciprocally with DLPFC and PM to recruit working memory
resources to resolve uncertainty.
s0135Simulation, Mental Imagery, and Semantic Memory
p0145Embodied cognition theories propose mental imagery, partic-
ularly automatic simulation varieties, as a core mechanism
for deep conceptual processing, rather than language with
which semantic memory has been commonly allied. For exam-
ple, hearing the word dog automatically simulates the sensori-
motor, affect, and/or mental state associated with experiences
of dogs (e.g., what they look like, how they move, feel, etc.).
The idea is that embodied processes encoded into the knowl-
edge system during the initial experience are later recapitulated
via cortical network simulation mechanisms in response to the
original stimulus (e.g., seeing a dog) or associated stimuli (e.g.,
the word, dog). The human capacity for symbolic cognition
arises from interactions between simulation in the cortical
knowledge network and linguistic processing. By this view,
nonhumans lack symbolic cognition insofar as they lack lin-
guistic processes, even though nonhuman animals have simu-
lation abilities like those in humans by virtue of common
cortical architectures for sensorimotor, emotion, and mental
state processes.
p0150However, mental imagery research has primarily investi-
gated not automatic imagery but rather strategic mental imag-
ery. Such studies, moreover, mainly use recently trained stimuli
for which episodic memory (not semantic memory) likely
dominates processing. For example, people are trained to
memorize a few pictures until they can visualize themmentally
with clear vivid detail. Later, while trying to (i.e., strategically)
visualize these pictures, they answer questions about them
requiring accurate mental images, such as whether a specific
object part falls within a location of a grid on a computer
screen. Consequently, little is known about mental imagery
evoked automatically when semantic memory is activated.
What is known comes mostly from studies of embodied cogni-
tion and two neuroimaging studies comparing episodic and
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semantic memory sources. The latter evidence implicates simi-
lar structures for imagery from episodic and semantic memory,
including visual association areas, the amygdala, which sup-
ports emotional processing, the MTL, and parts of the active
task and default networks. Notably, the right VLPFC is acti-
vated more during mental imagery based on episodic than
semantic memory, consistent with the possibility that most
prior mental imagery studies reveal how strategic mental imag-
ery from episodic memory works, which depends more on the
frontal lobe, but not necessarily automatic simulation (imag-
ery) from semantic memory.
s0140 Summary
p0155 Semantic and nonsemantic memory systems store knowledge
based on experience with the world independent from episodic
memory about the originating personal experiences. Initial
studies aimed to solve how language communicates concepts,
inspiring cognitive models describing hierarchies of concepts
composed of sets of overlapping features, semantic networks
that operate by activation spreading along links between con-
cepts, or memory decisions based on cues to conceptual asso-
ciations. Meaning is embodied in sensorimotor, emotion, and
mental state information processing but also may be organized
by domain in multiple semantic systems and may include an
amodal hub in the anterior temporal lobe. While words acti-
vate meaning between 300 and 500ms, knowledge evoked by
nonlinguistic objects (for which the perceptual form may con-
vey aspects of meaning) starts earlier by 200ms. Anticorrelated
active task and default state networks may support different
aspects of meaning, while the lateral prefrontal cortex controls
semantic memory retrieval and encoding. Conceptual proces-
sing depends critically upon automatic mental imagery simu-
lating information processing in these brain networks, which,
in humans, interacts with language to accomplish symbolic
reasoning functions.
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